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This article explores some of the thoughts on literature and its cognitive 
potential, its revelatory force, found in the philosophy of Danish thinker, 
philosopher and theologian K.E. Løgstrup. Løgstrup was a professor of ethics 
and the philosophy of religion at Aarhus University, and he was a very 
influential person in Danish culture from the 1950’s until his death in 1981. 
The topic in question here concerns the relation between art and reality – 
or to put it another way the relation between art and truth. Løgstrup will not be 
the only stepping stone, however, as we will take our point of departure in 
contemporary Norwegian novelist, and a philosophical thinker in his own right, 
Karl Ove Knausgård and the thoughts on literature and art found in his 
monumental series of six novels, My Struggle. In the sixth and final volume he 
reflects on Hölderlin’s aesthetics, especially the statement which Knausgård 
fully supports, that art seeks the space between language and reality1 – that this 
‘space’ is actually the nexus of art, because art receives its impetus or energy 
from the striving for truth, from the gravitational pull from reality. 
Now, if we focus on literature, it is especially apparent that the entire 
endeavour of relating literature to truth is paradoxical. Literature, being a work 
of art and language, seeks the space between language and reality, but how is 
this possible when literature is and has to be words and language? How can 
language hope to transcend language to reach a point between language and 
reality? To address this problem, Knausgård turns his attention to Hölderlin’s 
call to his reader, “Come on! Into the open, my friend”. Hölderlin was a poet, 
Knausgård reflects, and hence ‘the open’ must be an existential category. At the 
                                                        
1 Knausgård, Min kamp. Sjette bok, [My Struggle vol. 6], 349. All translations of Knausgård’s texts are 
my own as they have not yet been translated to English. 
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same time Hölderlin affiliates ‘the open’ with the utopic, “[…] and to a poet the 
utopic must be a world without language”.2 Knausgård continues: 
Poetry sought the space between language and the world in order to stand before the 
world as it is in itself; but when this insight, which might very well be the oldest of all 
insights, were to be committed or brought on to others, it could only be done through 
language, and in the same instant, what had been gained was lost. In a world outside 
language you can only exist in solitude.3 
This is the paradox, if you try to connect art and truth. The world is not a 
piece of art, so how can art be true? Reality is not linguistic, so how can it be 
found in language? Reality in itself does not have a perspective, so how can it 
be found in a painting? Futile as it may be, Knausgård reflects on this world 
outside language: 
A world without language was a world without categories, where every single thing, no 
matter how modest it may be, emerged as it was. It was a world without history, where 
nothing existed save the moment. A pine in that world wasn’t a ‘pine’, it wasn’t a ‘tree’ 
either, it was a nameless phenomenon, something which grew from the earth and 
moved in the wind. If you were standing on top of a slope, you would be able to see 
how these living growths move back and forth in the wind and to hear their whisper. 
This sight and this sound were impossible to communicate. And due to this it seemed 
as though they didn’t exist. But they did, and they do. You only have to take one step 
to the side, and the world changes. One sidestep, and you’re in the nameless world.4 
Knausgård connects this nameless world with the religious myth of the 
original harmony between man and world, the time before the original sin, 
when man fell out of the world and became alienated. The treachery in the 
religious myth, however, consists in its historicity, because it implies a before 
and an after. That the original harmony is lost is a historical occurrence in 
mythology, a lost natural condition of mankind, but this image betrays the fact 
that there is only the now: 
The divine flame burns now, the Garden of Eden exists now, you only need to take 
one step to the side and you are there. But this step is impossible for us to take, because 
we are human, and the place this step leads to is the inhuman.5 
                                                        
2 Ibid. 349. 
3 Ibid. 349f. 
4 Ibid. 350. 
5 Ibid. 351. 
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This quote seems to imply the futility of the ambition of connecting art 
with truth. Literature might seek the space between language and reality, but 
this place is unreachable, and hence art is just art, a fabrication of human 
endeavour, but always already stuck in its place well within human subjectivity 
and relativity. 
This, however, need not be the case, and not according to Knausgård 
either. If we focus on the literary work of art, it may not step into reality, or the 
nameless world, what Hölderlin called “into the open”, but it may stand on the 
border to the open and look into it – in much the same way as religion doesn’t 
stand inside the holy, but at the edge of it, looking towards it. This is what the 
work of art does, according to Knausgård, and it is quite plain to see that this 
is also what Knausgård himself tries to do in the quoted passages: to look into 
the open while he is standing within language trying to transcend it. While doing 
this he discovers what he finds to be the truth of both human beings and art: 
When I saw a real work of art or read real literature, all the brutality was pushed aside, 
for there was another dimension within the human realm, something quite different, 
of a completely different magnitude, dignity and significance. As an effect, it had 
caused people in the Middle Ages to build the enormous cathedrals, and in front of 
their splendour they became what they really were: little insignificant wretches. Yes, 
like little shits. But they were the ones who built them! They were both creators of the 
most spectacular and unearthly beauty, and little shits. That was the truth of the human 
being. Some things were significant, and other things were insignificant. Weakness was 
significant, and greatness was significant, but not what lies in-between.6 
This causes Knausgård to liken the truth of art to an epiphany, namely 
that something in the world appears, through and in spite of our image of it, 
and reveals itself as it is, in an instant.7 And the urge, which is to be understood 
as the driving force in art, is to accomplish this. 
The idea, that art and reality is related, or to put it in another way, that the 
true and the beautiful is somehow related, is of course not a new one. In ancient 
Greek philosophy, beauty and truth is closely connected – not just with each 
other but also with goodness. Together they form the classical triad, the good, the 
beautiful and the true. 
                                                        
6 Ibid. 348. 
7 Ibid. 634. 
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In an article from 1979 with the very unpoetical title Art and Knowledge II, 
K.E. Løgstrup reflects on the change of events in art history, which came about 
with Immanuel Kant at the end of the 18th century. Until then it had been 
accepted almost without discussion that art was connected with truth and 
ethics, but in a way where art was to be understood as standing in the service of 
truth and ethics. Art’s main purpose was to promote moral and cognitive truths, 
thus it served its purpose as an instrument of morality and knowledge. 
This changed with Kant, who insisted on the autonomy of the aesthetical 
experience. Art is beauty, but the experience of beauty is its own, it is 
autonomous, and that means that art cannot be subjugated under the 
censorship of ethics and knowledge, according to Kant. Instead, art should be 
seen as the cause of a certain kind of feeling, namely a disinterested feeling of 
pleasure, and as such the aesthetic feeling has nothing to do with the true or the 
good, i.e. with knowledge (or cognition) and ethics, but it is just a feeling in its 
own right. 
What Løgstrup proposes is to reinvestigate the ties between art, 
knowledge and ethics, but without reintroducing the external connection 
between them, where art is seen as being in their service. Kant’s insight here 
should not be forgotten, he insists. However, instead of seeking an external 
connection, we might be able to discover an internal connection, which Kant 
had overlooked. Here Løgstrup raises his central question: Is there a common 
ground within the nature of art, truth and goodness, and if so does this entail that art can 
never be in opposition to the true and the good? – without ceasing to be art in the strict 
sense, we might add (and yes, we do sense a familiar problem here). Løgstrup 
puts it like this: 
Hardly anyone dreams of once again bringing art under the yoke of knowledge and 
morality, of depriving the work of art of its autonomy in order to give it a pedagogical 
task. But this does not preclude the fact that our historical existence is enlightened by 
the aesthetic suspension, whether we want it or not.8 
The term aesthetic suspension, which Løgstrup introduces here, is central. He 
uses it to characterize the aesthetical experience in order to separate it from the 
                                                        
8 Løgstrup, Kunst og erkendelse [Art and Knowledge], 73/328 (page numbers refer to Danish and 
English texts respectively). 
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experience of our historical, or everyday, life. Here, it is vital to Løgstrup that 
we do not completely sever the connection between the two. This, however, 
only underlines the importance of a philosophical investigation of their 
differences. Were we to cut their connection off completely then the aesthetic 
experience would become esoteric, belonging only to its own aesthetic world. 
It would imply that the aesthetic experience had nothing to do with our 
historical life; this was Kant’s error. On the contrary, according to Løgstrup, 
the emotions are fundamentally the same in art and in our everyday life, but 
their mode of being there is different from the feelings stemming from our historical 
lives. 
But I believe that emotion in the aesthetic experiences comes into existence by the 
same contending factors as emotion in real life. It is in our own hope for the character 
in a drama or novel that our mind is moved, when hope continues, is annihilated or 
fulfilled by what happens. In the aesthetic experience, however, emotion does not exist 
as a disturbance of the mind. Thus, it must be there somehow in a suspended way. By 
suspended, I do not believe it to be removed, but that the mind is moved in sort of a 
hovering way.9 
It is important for Løgstrup to emphasize that this ‘suspension’ does not 
imply a loss of intensity. On the contrary, our feelings may often be far more 
intense in the aesthetic experience than they are in our ordinary life. What is 
then to be understood by the metaphor, that the mind is moved in a ‘hovering 
way’? He explains this through another metaphor, namely that “[t]he emotion’s 
centre of gravity is different in real life than in the aesthetic experience”.10 
In real life, the centre of gravity lies in the cause. In sorrow, the individual is affected 
by the one who is lost; in joy by the one who is given. In the aesthetic experience, the 
centre of gravity is shifted to what is revealed by the emotion. Therefore, we do not 
grieve when we aesthetically witness sorrow. It is due not solely to the fact that we 
know it is a fiction we see and hear. It is also due to something else that we do not 
grieve from the sorrow we see but from the actual loss. […] In real life, the one who 
sorrows has himself no thought of what the sorrow reveals about the fundamental 
conditions on which we live our lives. His thoughts are entirely on his loss. The sorrow 
comes from loss and goes to loss. On the other hand, what captures the mind of the 
spectator or reader is sorrow itself, its expression, and therefore he does not grieve but 
                                                        
9 Ibid. 59/312. 
10 Ibid. 60/313. 
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his mind is drawn to what sorrow shows about the fundamental conditions of our 
lives.11 
So, the emotion (in this case sorrow) is the same in real life and in the 
aesthetic experience, but because we as readers do not actually grieve we are 
able to perceive or understand sorrow and what sorrow reveals, when we 
encounter literature dealing with sorrow. In My Struggle book 6, Knausgård uses 
Hermann Broch’s famous novel The Death of Virgil to illustrate the same point 
as the one Løgstrup tries to make. In a passage, highly valued by Knausgård as 
the best prose sentence written in Europe in the last couple of centuries, Broch 
uses the words “loneliness with a hint of death” to describe the sea: 
The loneliness of the sea, shone upon by the sun, but yet mixed with a hint of death – 
I had never thought of the sea in this way, but I must have felt it, because when I read 
it something inside me recognizes it, vaguely, as if from a great distance. A recognition 
of something which I didn’t know what really was. And a recognition of the unknown, 
the mighty, the non-human, what death is about.12 
Broch uses this sentence to describe the movement from the solitude on 
the sea towards the peaceful human activity on the docks in Brindisi. Why is 
Broch’s description so powerful – or we might generalize the question: why are 
powerful literary descriptions so powerful? Knausgård provides an answer: 
[Broch’s paragraph] directs all of our attention to a fundamental condition [please observe 
the exact same use of words as we find in Løgstrup’s article, Knausgård just 
understands this to silently imply that the conditions are conditions of our lives] that we 
disregard more and more. That it does this in such a simple way [i.e. brings this 
condition into focus, BR], by connecting it to a concrete landscape in the world, a 
concrete moment in time, an early evening outside the harbour in Brindisi, the 
elements, the steel blue of the ocean shone upon by the sun, the pink glow of the sky, 
the whitewashed coast, the houses glinting in the sun which draws forth similar 
moments from the reader’s memories, all this turns the moment and what it contains 
of potential knowledge into an experience.13 
So, Broch’s description draws our attention to something which is there, it 
reveals something. What does it reveal? Certainly nothing esoteric or not of this 
world. On the contrary, it reveals the world, our world. To use two of 
                                                        
11 Ibid. 60/313f. 
12 Knausgård, Min kamp. Sjette bok, 615. 
13 Ibid. 616. 
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Løgstrup’s phrases: Broch reveals “the fundamental conditions of our lives”, 
or: “our historical existence is enlightened by the aesthetic suspension”. How 
does this come about? First of all it has to do with the concreteness of Broch’s 
literary description. This is a work of art, not of science or philosophy. We are 
not offered scientific proof of something or a philosophical and reasonable 
argument appealing to our logic and rationality. We are handed an experience, 
and Knausgård defines experience as “that which is seen, coloured by 
emotion”. And he elaborates: 
A chain of reasoning ignores emotion, it addresses our thoughts and reason 
exclusively, but to thoughts and reason the fact that an infinity of human beings have 
lived and died before us and that we who live now are also going to die is a banal 
insight, something we have known since the age of five. Only when you experience it, 
feel the abyss opening in even the most trivial of surroundings, do you understand it. 
Only then is it insight.14 
Løgstrup puts it like this: 
Philosophy can – at best – make an understanding clear. 
Poetry can make it [what is understood, BR] present.15 
To make an understanding present is to make it felt; to make the reasonable 
and philosophical understanding present to the mind of the reader; to make the 
reader attentive. 
This leads to a second reason for how literature (and art in general) can 
create experience and thus insight. To understand this we have to go into 
Løgstrup’s analysis of perception, art, and the relation between sensation and 
understanding. 
In what is a distinctly anti-Kantian statement Løgstrup claims that 
“[s]ensation gives us access in an immediate way to the world and in such an 
immediate way that we do not give a thought to how it occurs”.16 In perception, 
however, sensation is not the only cognitive operator. Much more in line with 
Kant, Løgstrup points to the other major factor, namely understanding. Sensation 
and understanding constitute perception in co-operation. In fact, they are so 
                                                        
14 Ibid. 616. 
15 Løgstrup, Den etiske fordring [The Ethical Demand], 230/205 (my modified translation). 
16 Løgstrup, Kunst og erkendelse, 9/291. 
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interwoven that we are unable to separate them: “We cannot hear the whistling 
without hearing that it belongs to the starlings”, Løgstrup claims. To the 
perceiver unfamiliar with ornithology we might add that we cannot hear the 
whistle without understanding it as that of a bird, and even when confronted 
with a completely unfamiliar sound the understanding would try to categorize 
it in familiar terms. In this way, perception is constituted by (1) immediate 
sensation, where reality or the world we live in imposes itself on us, and by (2) 
understanding, where we try to categorize and conceptualize the world we live 
in. So Løgstrup does not follow Kant’s Copernican Turn completely; he does so 
with regard to understanding (the categories) but not with regard to sensation 
(intuition): We are formed by sense impressions (as Hume proposed), but we, 
in turn, form what impresses itself on us in our attempt to understand it (more 
along the lines of Kant). 
To understand the work of art and its connection to reality we have to 
understand an important implication of this view on sensation. Sticking to the 
perception of a starling’s whistle, it is clear that the sensation of the whistle, in 
strictly physiological terms, excites the sense of hearing. As Løgstrup stated 
even in his pre-neuroscience day and age, the effect of this physiological 
exciting of the senses can be measured. But then he adds a point of vital 
importance to his analysis: 
But the sound does not excite the sense of hearing without altering the mind to which 
the sense of hearing belongs, and this attunement has quality.17 
This implies that every sense impression holds both physiologically 
measurable impact and emotional impact. We are physiologically and 
emotionally attuned by the sensation. The Danish term is “stemthed” originating 
from ‘stemning’, a parallel to the German term “Stimmung”, and it holds the 
double meaning of referring to an atmosphere or a mood, and to the act of 
tuning something, for example an instrument. So the impression affects us as a 
tuning of us, both our emotions (mood, atmosphere) and our measurable 
physiological perception. Here it is crucial to observe that Løgstrup does not 
mean this as merely an emotional or psychological reaction to the perceived 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 9/292. 
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impression, but rather that the reality attunes us through sensation! The 
emotional attunement is not a psychological reaction but an emotional 
perception. 
Obviously much of this happens on a subconscious level. It only rises to 
a conscious level when the attuned impression is very strong, when we see or 
hear something that moves us to a certain degree. But even the subconscious 
attunement can be brought to our conscious attention, according to Løgstrup. 
This can happen in retrospect, when we hear a sound or smell something, 
perhaps a specific perfume, reminding us of something concrete. In this 
recollection of memory, the mood we were in or the general atmosphere of the 
time, is reinvoked. We may have been completely ignorant of this at the time, 
because we were too close to it, or perhaps too hung up with other things to 
notice, but in retrospect it becomes clear. 
Consequently, every sense impression moves us to some degree, and here 
we find the key to Løgstrup’s inner connection between art and knowledge, and 
to Knausgård’s view (inspired by Hölderlin) that art receives its impetus or 
energy from the striving for truth, from the gravitational pull from reality. What 
does this effect on our feelings, caused by sensation, have to do with cognition 
and knowledge, Løgstrup asks, and he replies: “The attuned impression holds 
a cognitive content, a content which wants to be articulated”.18 And this is 
exactly what the work of art accomplishes; it articulates the attuned impression 
in such a way that the attunement, the emotional cognitive content, is preserved 
so that it can be carried over, or communicated, to the reader, listener, beholder 
etc. This isn’t necessarily possible in art exclusively, as the borders between art 
and language (or other forms of communication) isn’t clear; but Løgstrup 
would maintain that art, primarily because of its use of and sense for form, has 
a privileged function here. 
This doesn’t necessarily imply that the work of art is a conduit to truth. 
The artists are just as much in the wrong as everybody else, Løgstrup 
emphasizes. Impressions may be interpreted and used to say any number of 
things. But it does mean that in a work of art there is an urge towards explicating 
                                                        
18 Ibid. 10/293. 
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the concrete, just as Knausgård stated with Hermann Broch and his description 
of the concrete moment and landscape. This explication of a concrete 
sensation, the urge to unfold it, dwell upon it, communicate it, is an attempt at 
reaching knowledge or cognition – even though it might be flawed or 
misinterpreted. But the real work of art can communicate this impression to 
anyone who appreciates it. Art can reveal the emotional content of sensation 
and impression, things we sense mostly on a subconscious level, but which can 
be brought forward to our attention by the successful work of art; like the 
loneliness of the sea with a hint of death, to use Broch as an example. And here 
Knausgård sounds almost exactly like Løgstrup. In the paragraph following his 
connection between making an experience felt and the understanding and 
insight this leads to, he writes: 
This insight is almost impossible to articulate, because it contains so much. Because it 
is so fundamental, so central, Broch could have written pages and pages on this matter, 
of course, carefully elaborated on all possible aspects of both death in nature and our 
safeguards from it. But Broch wrote this when he was at the peak of his authorship 
and knew that what the text expresses [its subject matter, BR] and what it awakens are 
two completely different things.19 
As mentioned, the work of art is not just a direct conduit to truth. It 
involves interpretation by not only the person appreciating it but also by the 
artist. Both the subject matter of the work of art and the aesthetic means of 
expression used are closely connected to the artist’s world-view or 
understanding of life, as Løgstrup calls it. The artist choses a subject matter 
which enables him to evoke his view of life. The topic of the work of art is not 
just an anecdote without any perspective of relevance for the work of art, 
Løgstrup claims. And the aesthetic means of expression are also intentional, 
chosen by the artist – and the intention guiding the choice is exactly to help 
advance the view or understanding of life which the artist wants to promote or 
to bring into perspective. Be it colour and composition in a painting or choice 
of words and use of rhythm in poetry or prose. Of course, this need not be a 
fully conscious and deliberate act, but it guides the artistic process, on a 
conscious or subconscious level. 
                                                        




So far, we have only gone into the relation between art and truth, i.e. art 
and reality, but Løgstrup also promised to offer an account of the connection 
to the good, to ethics. In fact, the connection to the good is very close to the 
connection to truth. 
As we have seen, art holds revelatory force, enabling us to see and feel 
portions of reality which we ignore, overlook or are mostly blind to in our 
everyday life.  We live in an abstraction, Løgstrup says, reducing the world to 
practical surroundings. We see this in language, and here Løgstrup points 
towards the difference between two functions of language. 
Firstly, language serves our practical life, our actions. Here we define 
things, give them names and use these names, so that we may handle them. “I 
need a chair; you are in my seat” are examples. In our everyday life we tend to 
think of this as the only function of language, because it corresponds to the way 
we live most of the time. Here language and meaning is somehow closed-up. 
Whenever I ask for something’s name and purpose and then learn it, I can 
handle it, and my attention can move on to other things. 
This is completely different from the second language function, which 
Løgstrup calls the clarification of the impression. It is, however, just as original a 
contribution of language as that of name giving. This function of language is 
concerned with expressing the impressions we sense or receive, and this has a 
perpetual openness as a necessary precondition. To clarify an impression, you 
have to dwell upon it, explicate it, unfold it, express it. Løgstrup’s ties to the 
phenomenological tradition are plain to see. Here art comes into the picture in 
its attempt to express and articulate the world in a way which is not just name-
giving. 
And what does this have to do with ethics? The short answer is that a 
consequence of the closed-up, name-giving language function of our practical 
lives is not just a reduction of our appreciation of the sea, the sunset, or the 
smile on Mona Lisa’s lips on the painting in The Louvre. The consequence is also 
a reduction of people in general. We don’t just disregard aesthetic value, but 
also ethical value. The person in the lobby becomes the receptionist, a practical 
function. The person standing guard in Auschwitz becomes a Nazi, a 
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representative of evil. What can art do? It can open our closed-up, name-giving 
way of life and offer a perspective where our surroundings are revealed. Here 
we see the inspiration from the central Greek concept of Aletheia (ἀλήθεια), 
which was taken up again by Martin Heidegger. Aletheia means ‘disclosure’, 
‘truth’, ‘unclosedness’ or unconcealedness’ and refers to the uncovering of 
something, or of its becoming evident, or its coming into the open (we could 
recall Hölderlin and ad, “my friend”). Correspondingly, It is Løgstrup’s clear 
understanding that the human being is a reductive life form; we encounter the 
world, but keep shutting it down and closing it up in order to handle it, achieve 
our goals, and just to get by. This falsifying life form can be countered by art, 
be it prose, poetry, painting or even music, because art has the potential to 
reveal existence. Knausgård expresses this in his very resent personal encyclopedia, 
Om høsten (During Autumn), where he writes a Letter to an unborn daughter: 
This wonder that you will soon meet and get to see is so easy to lose sight of, and there 
are almost as many ways in which to do that, as there are people. That is why I write 
this book to you. I want to show you the world as it is all around us all the time. Only 
by doing so am I able to see it myself.20 
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